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ABSTRACT
When SARS struck Taiwan in the spring of 2003, many people feared that the disease would spread
through the healthcare system. As a result, outpatient medical visits fell by over 30 percent in the course
of a few weeks. This paper examines how both public information (SARS incidence reports) and private
information (the behavior and opinions of peers) contributed to this public reaction. We identify social
learning through a difference-in-difference strategy that compares long time community residents
to recent arrivals, who are less socially connected. We find that people learned from both public and
private sources during SARS. In a dynamic simulation based on the regressions, social learning substantially
magnifes the response to SARS.
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The public periodically confronts a novel and unfamiliar threat, such as a terrorist attack
or new disease outbreak. These situations typically spur people to take extreme protective
actions such as avoiding public places, putting down livestock, or curtailing air travel. In
such a crisis, a person must assess a new risk and decide how aggressively to protect himself.
However, it is unclear how people make these decisions given the scarcity of information
about the severity or prevalence of the threat.
The 2003 SARS epidemic in Taiwan allows us to study the response to an unfamiliar
risk. SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) is a respiratory illness that resembles severe
pneumonia and is transmitted through close interpersonal contact. SARS reached Taiwan
from mainland China in March of 2003. 312 people were con￿rmed to be infected and 82
people died before the epidemic disappeared in July of that year. Despite the low prevalence
of SARS in the general population, the public strongly eschewed restaurants, shopping cen-
ters, and other public places (Chou et al. 2004, Siu and Wong 2004). The high infection rate
in hospitals also caused people to avoid the health care system: outpatient visits fell by 31
percent in April and May of 2003 (Hsieh et al. 2004). This drop occurred both in locations
with and without SARS, and persisted for months after the epidemic had passed.
Health care avoidance during SARS is an example of a ￿prevalence response," which is
a familiar topic in the literature on economic epidemiology (Ahituv et al. 1996, Gersovitz
and Hammer 2003, Lakdawalla et al. 2006). Facing an increase in disease risk, people pro-
tect themselves and thereby limit the spread of infection. With few exceptions (de Paula
et al. 2010, Gong 2010), this literature has assumed that decision makers possess com-
plete information. Such an assumption is unrealistic for a disease outbreak. In even the
most saturated media environment, public announcements only weakly indicate a person￿ s
idiosyncratic infection risk. Without a precise public signal, people may rely on private
signals such as the opinions or actions of their peers. This mechanism may cause an ￿in-
formation cascade" that magni￿es the response to an unfamiliar threat (Bikchandani et
1al. 1992, Banerjee 1992, Welch 1992). If social learning is an important determinant of be-
havior in this setting, it may mediate the e⁄ectiveness of public policies to address a crisis.
This paper measures the contributions of public and private risk information to the
SARS response. Reports of local and national SARS incidence provide public risk signals.
We proxy for private risk signals using the change in health care utilization among peers
from a pre-SARS baseline. We derive this proxy from a simple model of health care de-
mand. A regression of individual medical visits on these variables distinguishes between the
contributions of public and private information sources. Our analysis utilizes a nationally
representative panel of medical claims of 1 million people (4.3 percent of Taiwan￿ s popula-
tion). This source allows us to quantify the number of outpatient visits by patient, provider
and two-week period from 2001 to 2003 for a sub-sample of 29,619 people. We proxy for
peer groups, which the claims data do not directly measure, using cohorts of patients who
visit a common physician and facility.
Identifying social learning through a regression of individual outcomes on group out-
comes is challenging because common unobservables jointly determine both variables (Manski
2000). Patients in the health care market may sort into peer groups because of common risk
or health preferences that a⁄ect their response to SARS. Heterogeneous supply shocks, such
as o¢ ce closures by some doctors, may also induce a spurious correlation. Patients in the
same peer group may also receive correlated signals of SARS risk if they obtain news from
the same media sources. We address these concerns through a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence design
that compares the response of longtime community residents (￿non-movers") to the response
of recent arrivals (￿movers") who are less socially connected. We ￿nd that social learning
has an e⁄ect that is slightly smaller than the e⁄ect of national incidence reports.
The identifying assumption of this approach is that unobservable shocks to visits do
not di⁄erentially a⁄ect non-movers during the SARS period. We evaluate this assumption
through a complementary identi￿cation strategy. This approach addresses common unob-
servables by controlling for the current level of peer visits and uses variation in peer visits
2from the previous year to identify e⁄ects. Conceptually, this approach compares individual
responses in peer groups with the same levels of current visits and di⁄erent levels of visits one
year earlier. Fixing current visits, a peer group whose visits were previously high conveys a
stronger signal of SARS risk than a group whose visits were previously low. This approach
allows us to address the residual concern about the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence regression that
unobservable shocks speci￿c to non-movers cause a spurious correlation. In a ￿nal falsi￿ca-
tion test, we apply our methodology to the annual drop in visits that occurs during Chinese
New Year and ￿nd that social learning does not explain this phenomenon.
Our study contributes to the literature on economic epidemiology as well as the litera-
ture on social learning. In economic epidemiology, we provide the ￿rst examination of the
individual behavioral response to a new outbreak and demonstrate that under incomplete
information, the response elasticity varies by information source. Social learning may cause
the public perception of disease prevalence to diverge from reality, with important implica-
tions for infection control. This paper also contributes to the literature on social learning by
analyzing a novel context in which social learning is likely to be important. Several studies
have considered learning in the context of technology adoption or consumption (Foster and
Rosenzweig 1995, Munshi 2004, Conley and Udry 2010, Moretti 2010). The few studies that
examine medical utilization do not consider the context of a health emergency. The extreme
behavior that many people exhibit during an emergency suggests that people may process
information di⁄erently in this setting.
This paper proceeds in Section 2 to develop a simple model that relates learning to our
empirical approach. This framework motivates the use of the change in visits as a proxy
for perceived risk and clari￿es the relationship between regression coe¢ cients and structural
parameters. Section 3 describes the health care setting in Taiwan, the SARS epidemic,
and the data set. Regression results appear in Section 4. Section 5 describes a dynamic
simulation of the aggregate response to SARS. This exercise utilizes the regression estimates
to illustrate the dynamic impact of social learning. Section 6 concludes.
32 Theory
In this section, we motivate our empirical approach with a theoretical framework that relates
learning and health care utilization. We present a simple model of individual belief formation
about SARS risk. We then incorporate the decision to seek health care and illustrate the
conditions under which a person￿ s observable change in medical visits over time proxies for
his perception of SARS risk.
2.1 Learning About SARS Risk
People are indexed by i and belong to peer groups that are indexed by j and have size Nj.
Each person decides whether to visit the doctor during period t. By visiting, the patient
faces perceived risk sijt 2 [0;1] of contracting SARS and dying. Individuals learn about
sjt by observing realizations of this parameter from various data sources we describe below.
People assume that SARS is distributed binomially in the population. This implies that the
posterior probability of an individual catching SARS is a linear function of the means from
the di⁄erent sources of information (Jewell 1974).
Three data sources provide individuals information on SARS risk. First, the government
draws a sample from the distribution of SARS. Speci￿cally it tracks new SARS cases and
reports the mean SARS incidence, sc
jt 2 [0;1]. This is a common public signal of SARS
risk. Second, people obtain an independent, private estimate of SARS risk, s
p
ijt 2 [0;1]. The
independent private estimate re￿ ects personal risk factors, including frequency of contact
with others and use of a mask outdoors.1 Third, each individual samples his peers￿private
estimates of SARS risk, fs
p
:ijtg.2
Using these three data sources, individuals update their beliefs using Bayes theorem. A
binomial distribution for SARS implies that person i￿ s posterior on his own probability of
1Although the private draw is independent of the common signal, the individual￿ s personal posterior will
depend on the common signal as well.
2People may sample peers￿beliefs by communicating directly or by observing behaviors like the change
in health care utilization, which indicate beliefs. Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and O⁄erman and Schotter
(2009) develop models of social learning from peer behavior.
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p
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In this expression, Ij is the set of individuals in peer group j. The weights, ￿, are increasing
in the reliability and precision of the signal (?).
Our empirical objective is to test whether individual posterior beliefs on risk actually give
positive weight to the common signal or peers￿independent private signals. For tractability,
we make two assumptions about these weights. First, we assume that individuals give
identical weight to the private information from di⁄erent peers, i.e., ￿3il = ￿3i. Second, we
assume that all individuals place the same weight on each information source, i.e., ￿mi = ￿m
for m 2 f1;2;3g.3 Given these assumptions, we can represent each agent￿ s learning process
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ljt=(Nj ￿1) is the average private signal of peers. People learn from
the common signal if ￿1 > 0, from their own independent private signal if ￿2 > 0, and from
the independent private signals of peers if ￿3 > 0.
If each of these signals were observable, a regression based on equation (1) would identify
these weights. Our primary empirical challenge is that the private signals of person i and
his peers, s
p
ijt and ￿ s
p
:ijt, are unobservable. We propose to address the inability to observe
the private signal of peers, ￿ s
p
:ijt, by replacing it with the average posterior risk perception
of peers, ￿ s:ijt =
P
l2I;l6=i sljt=(Nj ￿1), for which we will propose a proxy in the next section.
3This assumption is stronger than necessary. It would be su¢ cient if the weight placed placed by person
i on source m had the structure ￿mi = ￿m+umi where umi is mean independent of the SARS risk estimated
from source m. Under this assumption, the weights function as coe¢ cients in a random coe¢ cients regression
model. The mean independence assumption is reasonable for our data. The main source of variation in
individual weights is the size of person i￿ s peer group. The correlation between our proxy for the risk
perceptions of peers (developed in the next section) and group size is very low (￿ = ￿0:03).
5The average posterior on SARS risk among peers is
￿ s:ijt = ￿1s
c














The ￿rst two terms of this expression have the same interpretation as in equation (1). The
third term captures social learning by peers from other peers, including learning from person
i. This feedback complicates substitution of overall peer beliefs for peers￿private signals in
equation (1).
In order to simplify expressions (1) and (2), we assume that Nj is large.4 In small groups,
individual risk perceptions can have a meaningful impact on average group risk perceptions.
This impact vanishes as group size increases: limNj!1 ￿ s
p
:ijt = ￿ s
p
jt. Under this assumption,





ijt + ￿3￿ s
p
jt + wijt (3)
￿ s:ijt ￿ ￿1s
c
jt + (￿2 + ￿3)￿ s
p
jt + ￿ w:ijt (4)
where wijt = ￿4sijt￿1. We obtain an expression for individual beliefs in terms of the average
signal of peers by isolating ￿ s
p















￿ s:ijt + uijt (5)
The equation above still cannot be estimated because we do not observe person i￿ s
independent private information. In its place, we propose a hypothetical regression of the
individual￿ s risk perception on the common signal and the group risk perception.
sijt = ￿0 + ￿1s
c
jt + ￿2￿ s:ijt + uijt (6)
4A large Nj assumption is reasonable because the median peer group size is 55 in our data. Limiting the
sample to only large networks, for which this assumption is most valid, does not a⁄ect our results.
6Person i￿ s private signal, s
p
ijt, appears in equation (5) but is an omitted variable in equa-
tion (6). This omission does not bias the estimate of ￿1 however, because the individual￿ s
private signal is independent of the common signal. Nor does the omission bias ￿2 be-
cause independence also ensures that s
p
ijt is uncorrelated with ￿ s:ijt. For large values of Nj,
corr(s
p




:ijt), which is zero.
2.2 The Change in Visits: a Proxy for Perceived Risk
To estimate regression (6), we must either observe or proxy for individual and group risk
perceptions sijt and ￿ s:ijt. Here we motivate the use of the change in medical visits over time
as a proxy for perceived risk and explain what a regression employing this proxy reveals
about the structural parameters.
When deciding whether to see the doctor, a person compares his level of illness to his
perceived cost of a visit. In general, this cost includes the copayment (which is less than
U.S. $5 per visit) and the cost of transportation to the medical facility. During SARS, the
cost also includes the risk of contracting SARS during the visit. Moreover, holding illness
and other costs constant, a change in visits indicates a change in the perceived SARS risk.
More formally, people receive utility from health and other consumption, hijt and mijt,
respectively. In each period, people experience a health shock, dijt ￿ 0, and must decide
whether to seek medical care, vijt 2 f0;1g. A visit to the doctor restores the patient to his
baseline health, but requires him to pay a copayment ct. During the SARS epidemic, people
also face the risk that a visit may cause them to catch SARS and die. After normalizing the
utility from death to be zero, the expected utility from visiting and not visiting the doctor
7are:5
EU[vijt = 1] = (1 ￿ sijt)u(hijt;mijt ￿ ct) (7)
EU[vijt = 0] = u(hijt ￿ dijt;mijt) (8)
A person seeks care if the value of alleviating his illness exceeds the cost of treatment:
EU[vijt = 1] > EU[vijt = 0]. Taking logs yields to the following equivalent expression.
ln(1 ￿ sijt) + lnu(hijt;mijt ￿ ct) ￿ lnu(hijt ￿ dijt;mijt) > 0
In this formulation, the probability of a visit depends upon the person￿ s health status and
his perceived SARS risk.
An observer wishing to interpret the change in visits as an indicator of perceived risk
must account for secular trends in health. To satisfy this requirement, we assume that the
di⁄erence in log utility from seeking care rather than not seeking care is a trend-stationary
function of the person￿ s age: lnu(hijt;mijt￿ct)￿lnu(hijt￿dijt;mijt) = ￿ij+gaijt￿eijt, where
aijt is the person￿ s age.6 The error term, eijt, is identically and independently distributed
throughout the population, with mean zero, cumulative distribution F(e), and density f(e).
Under this formulation, people experience idiosyncratic health shocks with a mean that
linearly increases with age. The ￿rst expression below shows the probability of a visit under
these assumptions. In the second expression, we apply a ￿rst-order Taylor-series expansion
at a suitable common point, ￿ e, in the distribution of eijt, and incorporate the approximation
5Without loss of generality, we ignore the dynamic e⁄ects of current health decisions. Our approach
can incorporate these e⁄ects by reinterpreting the contemporaneous utility function as a value function that
embeds future optimizing behavior.
6Under the assumption of a quadratic trend, equations (11) and (12) become non-linear functions of age.
8that ln(1 ￿ sijt) ￿ ￿sijt for small values of sijt.
pr[vijt = 1] = F[ln(1 ￿ sijt) + ￿ij + gaijt] (9)
￿ F(￿ e) ￿ f(￿ e)[sijt ￿ ￿ij ￿ gaijt + ￿ e] (10)
The probability of a visit is thus an a¢ ne transformation of SARS risk, the idiosyncratic
health endowment, and age.
The ￿rst di⁄erence of this probability is our proxy for an individual￿ s perceived SARS
risk. We subtract the number of visits during a comparable pre-SARS period (when sijt = 0)
from the number of visits in the index period. The change in visits, ￿vijt = vijt￿vijt￿k, nets
out the time-constant health endowment and F(￿ e). Likewise, the change in average peer
visits, ￿￿ v:ijt = ￿ v:ijt ￿ ￿ v:ijt￿k, proxies for the average risk perception of the peer group.
E[￿vijt] ￿ f(￿ e)gk ￿ f(￿ e)sijt (11)
E[￿￿ v:ijt] ￿ f(￿ e)gk ￿ f(￿ e)￿ s:ijt (12)
A person who is familiar with f(￿ e) and the e⁄ect of age on health, g, can infer sijt and ￿ s:ijt
from the change in individual and group visits, respectively.
Our empirical strategy uses these proxies to estimate a version of the hypothetical re-
gression in (6):
￿vijt = ￿0 + ￿1s
c
jt + ￿2￿￿ v:ijt + ￿ijt (13)
By substituting in the expressions for ￿vijt, ￿￿ vijt, sijt and ￿ s:ijt, we ￿nd that ^ ￿1 and ^ ￿2 have
the following structural interpretations.










9Although the system (which also includes an expression for E[^ ￿0]) is not identi￿ed, the
coe¢ cient estimates test whether people learn from public information and from peers. A
signi￿cant value of ^ ￿1 indicates that people learn from public information, while a signi￿cant
value of ^ ￿2 indicates that people learn from their peers. The signs on these coe¢ cients di⁄er
because an increase in ￿￿ v:ijt indicates less risk while an increase in sc
jt indicates greater risk.
In equation (15), ^ ￿2 provides the contribution of social learning relative to the combined
contribution of social learning and the individual private signal. A coe¢ cient estimate that
is signi￿cantly less than 1 indicates that people also respond to their own private information.
Equation (14) also shows that ^ ￿1 underestimates the response to public information
because ￿2=(￿2 + ￿3) < 1. A complementary regression of the change in individual visits on
just the common signal, however, eliminates this source of attenuation.
￿vijt = ￿3 + ￿4s
c
jt + !ijt (16)
Because information sources are orthogonal in equation (1), excluding ￿￿ v:ijt from this re-
gression does not cause omitted variables bias. The coe¢ cient on the common signal has
the following structural interpretation:
E[^ ￿4] = ￿f(￿ e)￿1
Using this coe¢ cient estimate rather than ^ ￿1 leads to a larger and more accurate estimate
of learning from public information. A regression based on equation (16) will prove useful
for the dynamic simulation in Section 5, where it serves as a predictive model that better
captures the response to public information.
103 Context and Data
3.1 The SARS Epidemic in Taiwan
Taiwan is a densely populated island located near mainland China. The country has a
population of 23.1 million and income per capita of around $31,000. Modern highways
and railways facilitate intercity travel. Taiwan is made up of 25 counties and cities, which
further subdivide into 368 townships and urban districts (hereafter labeled ￿counties" and
￿townships" respectively). The population has a median age of 37 and a life expectancy
of 78. Chinese New Year, which occurs on a lunar schedule in January or February, is an
important holiday that causes a large decline in medical visits. During the two-week holiday,
many families travel to visit relatives and some medical o¢ ces close. This holiday has a large
impact on health care utilization in the ￿gures below.
In 1996, Taiwan implemented a universal fee-for-service health care system (Cheng 2003).
Under the system, patients contribute modest copayments of US$5 or less for visits, tests,
and prescriptions. The Bureau of National Health Insurance (BNHI) administers the system
and reimburses providers for most expenses. People may obtain outpatient care from either
hospital outpatient departments or small storefront clinics. Clinics, which are ubiquitous in
cities, serve around 70 percent of the outpatient market. With such low copayments, many
patients prefer to visit the doctor (and obtain medicine) for minor illnesses such as sore
throats and colds. These conditions, classi￿ed broadly as ￿upper respiratory infections,"
constitute 38 percent of all outpatient visits. The low out-of-pocket cost has led to intense
health care utilization, with patients seeking care a median of 10 times per year.
SARS is a respiratory illness that resembles severe pneumonia. The disease is caused by
a coronavirus and is transmitted through close contact with an infected person. The SARS
epidemic originated in Guandong, China in November of 2002 and soon spread to Hong
Kong, Southeast Asia, and Canada. Taiwan￿ s ￿rst SARS case occurred in a traveler who
became ill on March 14, 2003 after arriving from mainland China. The epidemic escalated
11on April 22 when an indigenous outbreak among patients and hospital sta⁄ at the Ho-Ping
Hospital in Taipei led to several secondary outbreaks in other major cities. Figure ?? plots
the number of reported and probable SARS cases (explained below) by two-week period to
show the progression of the epidemic. The SARS epidemic lasted through June, leading
to a total of 312 con￿rmed infections and 82 deaths. At the peak of the epidemic, SARS
infected 60 and killed 6 people per day. Nevertheless, the overall burden of SARS was only
1.4 con￿rmed cases and 0.36 deaths per 100,000 people.
The Ho-Ping Outbreak, which took place during Period 9 in the ￿gure, led to wide-
spread panic. According to Ko et al. (2006, p. 398), ￿People started to hoard all possible
protective equipment, and reject people or materials with any risk of infection, including
infected patients, the families of patients, subjects quarantined, and even health providers."
Domestic air travel fell by 30 percent and international air travel fell by 58 percent from 2002
levels (National Policy Foundation 2003). The price of Isatidis Radix, a traditional Chinese
antiviral remedy, rose by 800 percent (Huang 2003).
The SARS epidemic also had a large impact on health care utilization. Figure ?? plots
the nationwide volume of outpatient visits by two-week period in 2001, 2002, and 2003. In
a sharp deviation from the usual seasonal pattern, visits fell by over 30 percent from March
to June of 2003. Visits did not return to the pre-SARS level until September of that year,
three months after the last probable SARS case on June 16. Based on the number of SARS
deaths and outpatient visits from March-June of 2003, SARS created a mortality risk of at
most 0.0000007 deaths per visit. Using an upper-bound estimate of $2.2 million for the value
of statistical life (Hammitt and Liu 2004), the risk of SARS death during a medical visit
raised the expected price of a visit by $1.93. However the decline in visits during SARS is
consistent with a much larger perceived cost. After a copayment increase of $3 in November
of 2002, visits to medical centers fell by 3 percent. Benchmarking the SARS response by
this copayment response, people behaved as if SARS had increased the price of a visit by
12$17.60.7
The response to SARS occurred both in townships with and without actual SARS in-
cidence. Figure ?? plots total visits, comparing townships with zero and positive SARS
incidence. The response to SARS is only slightly larger in townships that actually experi-
enced the outbreak. The timing and magnitude of the SARS response also depended on the
nature of the visit. Figure ?? categorizes visits as respiratory, critical, chronic, or other.8
Although utilization fell in all categories, the response of respiratory visits was particularly
sharp and extended. These visits fell by over 50 percent and remained suppressed through
the end of the year. Although respiratory visits are distinct in several aspects, the low
marginal bene￿t of a respiratory visit is the most likely explanation for this pattern.9
3.2 Signals of Risk
Under incomplete information, a decision maker may seek new information sources and
tailor his response to a signal￿ s credibility and precision. Common signals of risk, such as
public announcements of disease incidence, convey the average risk in a population. However
these signals may provide little information about idiosyncratic risk, which depends upon a
person￿ s behavior and social interactions. Common signals are especially noisy during a new
disease outbreak, when even experts do not fully understand the disease￿ s severity or mode
of transmission.
Data on SARS incidence from the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (TCDC) represent
a common signal of SARS risk. The agency released these reports daily to intense media
coverage. The front page of the Apple Daily News on May 22, 2003 in Figure 1 exempli￿es
7The mortality risk calculation assumes conservatively that all SARS deaths arise because of outpatient
visits. Consistent with the extreme response, Liu et al. (2005) ￿nd that the VSL associated with avoiding
SARS risk is several times greater than conventional VSL measurements from Taiwan.
8Critical visits include visits related to pregnancy, abortion, injury, appendicitis, stroke, heart attack,
and internal bleeding. Chronic visits include visits related to dialysis, chemotherapy, diabetes, and liver or
kidney failure.
9Patients with mild respiratory illnesses may have also feared that doctors would place them in quarantine
(Hsieh et al. 2005). As a respiratory condition, SARS could also have increased respiratory visits among
people concerned about possible exposure.
13the print coverage of SARS. The lead story describes a restriction on travel out of Taiwan.
On the left, a map shows the cumulative number of SARS cases by county, and a table
summarizes the number of cases and deaths nationwide. Although both local and national
incidence contain information, national incidence may provide a more meaningful signal in
a small country like Taiwan.
Without precise objective information, people may turn to private signals such as the
perceptions or behavior of their peers. As our model shows, the change in visits from an
earlier (risk-free) period indicates a person￿ s risk perception. This signal is noisy for a
particular individual because health varies idiosyncratically: a decline in visits during SARS
could merely indicate the absence of a prior illness. Aggregation within a group reduces the
idiosyncratic noise in this signal.
Consistent with an increase in social learning, inter-group variation in the frequency
of visits increased during SARS (Glaeser et al. 1996, Graham 2008). Figure ?? plots the
coe¢ cient of variation (CV) in visits by two-week period, distinguishing between variation
within and across peer groups.10 In a pattern speci￿c to 2003, inter-group variation rose
dramatically during SARS while intra-group variation remained ￿ at. The reader should
interpret the increase in dispersion cautiously since a decline in the mean of visits may
mechanically in￿ ate the CV. However the CV only increases slightly during Chinese New
Year (Period 3 of 2003), despite an even larger decline in visits at that time.
3.3 Data
Our primary data source is a large panel of medical claims furnished by the BNHI. The data
set contains all outpatient visits from 1997 to 2003 for a representative sample of one million
people (4.3 percent of Taiwan￿ s population). We obtain a manageable regression data set by
drawing a random 6 percent subsample through the procedure below. For each individual
￿ peer group, the regression data set contains 78 biweekly observations from 2001 to 2003.
10Because visits are bounded by zero, the decline in visits mechanically reduces the standard deviation.
The coe¢ cient of variation partially corrects for this issue.
14The dependent variable is the number of outpatient visits by a patient to the doctor who
de￿nes a particular peer group.
The patient￿ s actual peer group￿ his family, friends, and neighbors￿ is unobservable. We
proxy for peer groups using cohorts of patients who visit the same physician and medical
facility from 2001 to 2003. Using this measure, 93.1 percent of the population belongs to at
least one peer group and the median number of peer groups is seven. Quartiles of the group
size distribution occur at 12, 55, and 204 people. A peer group de￿nition based on common
health care utilization is sensible for two reasons. People typically seek outpatient care for
mild conditions and are unwilling to travel far outside the community. Outpatient health
care markets in Taiwan are highly localized and many neighbors visit the same physician.
The referral process also leads to social ties among patients of the same doctor. Because most
patients select a physician through a friend￿ s referral, patients of a common physician often
share a direct or indirect acquaintance (Hoerger and Howard 1995, Tu and Lauer 2008).11
Noise in the de￿nition of a peer group is a common issue that does not ordinarily interfere
with the identi￿cation of social interactions as long as the true social network overlaps with
the proxy (Blume et al. 2011). Misspeci￿cation of peer groups most likely (though not
necessarily) causes attenuation bias through the same mechanism as classical measurement
error. In Section 4, we show that results are robust to de￿ning peer groups by facility,
township, or county. Results are also similar if a person must visit twice from 2001-2003
rather than just once in order to count as a group member.12
The one-year change in average visits of peers proxies for the group￿ s perception of SARS
risk. ￿ v:ijt denotes the average number of visits in group j, excluding the index person. This
variable is the sum over periods t￿2 to t, allowing it to re￿ ect SARS risk information from
the recent past. The change in peer visits, ￿￿ v:ijt is the di⁄erence in ￿ v:ijt from the same
11Published evidence of this phenomenon from countries other than the US is extremely limited. Anecdo-
tally, referrals are especially important in Taiwan because there few institutional restrictions (such as HMO
networks) on the choice of physician.
12If group membership requires two rather than one visit, then 85 percent of the population belongs to at
least one group and the median number of groups per person is 4. Quartiles of the group size distribution
occur at 6, 29, and 115 people.
15two-week period in the previous year: ￿￿ v:ijt ￿ ￿ v:ijt ￿ ￿ v:ijt￿26. The lagged component of
￿￿ v:ijt always captures pre-SARS utilization because SARS lasted for less than a year. While
the duration of the di⁄erence is arbitrary, a one-year di⁄erence implicitly removes seasonality
from the regressor. Regressions in which ￿￿ v:ijt is constructed as a six-month di⁄erence lead
to similar results.
Our identi￿cation strategy distinguishes between longtime community residents (￿non-
movers") and people who have recently joined the community (￿movers").13 Recent arrivals
have weaker ties to their peers because people establish social connections over time (Jackson
2009). To identify movers, we ￿rst calculate the overlap in outpatient tra¢ c between all
pairwise combinations of townships. Next we determine each patient￿ s modal township by
year and de￿ne a move as a transition across townships with low overlap.14 This process
allows us to classify people by tenure status in the community, which ranges from 1 to ￿ 7
years. Movers are de￿ned as people who join their 2003 township in 2001 or later, so that
they either one or two years of tenure. Under this de￿nition, movers make up 5.6 percent of
the population, people with tenure of 3-6 years make up 6.6 percent of the population, and
people with tenure of ￿ 7 years make up 87.8 percent of the population.
Our sampling procedure is designed to increase statistical power by oversampling people
with tenure below 7 years and balancing the sample of movers and non-movers within each
peer group. We begin by discarding peer groups that contain only movers or only non-movers
(2 percent of all observations). For the remaining peer groups, we draw up to four people
each who have tenure of 1, 2, or ￿ 7 years. This step increases the proportion of movers
and reduces the proportion of people with tenure of ￿ 7 years in the sample relative to the
population. We also increase the representation of people with 3, 4, 5, or 6 years of tenure by
13The identi￿cation strategy exploits heterogenous exposure to social interactions among subsets of the
peer group. Cohen-Cole (2006) and Blume et al. (2011, Theorem 2) derive the conditions under which this
approach is valid. Despite the super￿cial similarity, this strategy is distinct from Gaviria and Raphael (2001),
who test the endogeneity of school choice by comparing movers and non-movers.
14As a baseline, townships have low overlap if they fall below the ￿fth percentile of the overlap distribution,
so that less than 0.17 percent of patients visit doctors in both townships. As we show below, results are
robust to using the tenth percentile of overlap (0.92 percent) as an alternative cuto⁄.
16drawing up to two people from each group. The procedure yields a regression data set with
38.8 percent movers and an adequate sample of people with tenure of 3-6 years. Regressions
use probability weights to restore the population proportions of these groups.
Table ?? compares the characteristics of movers and non-movers. The large sample
ensures that many small di⁄erences between movers and non-movers are statistically sig-
ni￿cant. In Panel A, non-movers average 0.045 visits per period to a particular physician
￿ facility, while movers average 0.035 visits per period. Both movers and non-movers are
diagnosed with respiratory infections (e.g. a sore throat or cold) in around 40 percent of
visits. Movers and non-movers have similar characteristics, although movers are younger
and more likely to be male. Movers earn US$30 less per month than non-movers.15 Panel
B summarizes the characteristics of peer groups. Peer characteristics are balanced because
movers and non-movers are sampled in approximately ￿xed proportions within groups.
To investigate homophily within peer groups, Table ?? reports the correlation between
individual characteristics and the group means of these characteristics (excluding the index
person). Among patients of a common physician ￿ facility in Column 1, these correlations
are 0.42, 0.66, and 0.30 for gender, age, and income respectively. The correlation is also high
for the number of peer groups per patient, the annual number of visits per patient, and the
location of the peer group in the patient￿ s modal township. In Columns 4-6, the correlation
falls monotonically as the peer group broadens to the facility, township, or county. A table
of intraclass correlation coe¢ cients (available from the authors) shows the same pattern.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table ?? show that movers and non-movers exhibit a similar degree
of homophily with their peers. The correlation with the group mean is comparable across
movers and non-movers for income, the number of peer groups per patient, and the location
of the peer group in the patient￿ s modal township. Movers have a higher correlation with
the group for gender but a lower correlation for age.
The Taiwan CDC provides data on the incidence of ￿reported" and ￿probable" SARS
15Income data based on BNHI estimates of earnings by occupation category are available for 62% of the
sample.
17cases. A reported case is any case that the TCDC investigates as a possible SARS infection.
A probable case is a reported case that also (1) exhibits high fever and di¢ culty breathing,
(2) an epidemiological link to other SARS cases, and (3) radiographic evidence of pneumonia
or respiratory distress syndrome or a positive assay for the SARS coronavirus (WHO 2003).16
To express SARS incidence, s, as an infection probability, we compute the number of cases
per 100 people. Regressions also utilize a SARS period indicator, which equals 1 for Quarters
2-4 of 2003. As with ￿￿ v:ijkt, SARS incidence is a sum over periods t ￿ 2 to t.
4 Estimation
4.1 Empirical Approach
In this section, we estimate the response to public and peers￿private information about
risk. In a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence style speci￿cation, social learning is the di⁄erential e⁄ect





t + ￿3StNi￿￿ v:ijkt + ￿4vijkt￿26
+ [levels and pairwise interactions of St;Ni; and ￿￿ v:ijkt] (17)
+ ￿jk + ￿t + ￿ijkt
In this speci￿cation, i indexes the patient, j indexes the physician ￿ facility, k indexes the
township, and t indexes the two-week period. The dependent variable, vijkt is the number of
outpatient visits. Consistent with the interpretation of ￿vijkt as the patient￿ s risk percep-
tion, the regression controls for the one-year lag of the dependent variable, vijkt￿26.17 The
16Con￿rmatory diagnostic tests for SARS did not become available until midway through the epidemic.
Even once these tests arrived, authorities did not provide immediate con￿rmation of SARS infection. There-
fore, people did not generally have information about con￿rmed SARS incidence.
17We control for vijkt￿26 rather than use ￿vijkt as the dependent variable in order to avoid endogeneity
due to serial correlation in individual risk perceptions. If perceptions are serially correlated, then lags of
vijkt belong as controls in the speci￿cation. However, these lags are functionally dependent upon vijkt￿26.
Regressing on vijkt￿26 is the most direct solution to this problem.
18speci￿cation includes the number of local and national SARS cases per 100 people, sl
kt and
sn
t , and the one-year change in peer visits, ￿￿ v:ijkt. Local cases are calculated by township.
St identi￿es the SARS period (Quarters 2-4 of 2003) and Ni identi￿es non-movers.
A peer group ￿xed e⁄ect, ￿jk, controls for time constant attributes of the peer group,
allowing the regression to compare groups with similar levels of utilization.18 A time ￿xed
e⁄ect, ￿t, controls for systematic time variation in visits. Because sn
t and ￿t are collinear,
speci￿cations that include sn
t utilize separate period and year (rather than period ￿ year)
￿xed e⁄ects. We estimate the model using OLS and cluster standard errors by the modal
townships of patients. The regressions employ probability weights to restore the population
proportion of movers and weight patients equally. Negative signs for ^ ￿1 and ^ ￿2 indicate
avoidance of SARS risk based on public information. A positive sign for ^ ￿3 indicates a
response to the risk perceptions of peers.
The correlation between vijkt and ￿￿ v:ijkt may arise because common unobservables
jointly in￿ uence individual and group behavior (Manski 1993, Manski 2000). The SARS
period interaction ensures that any confounder must exhibit a di⁄erentially strong in￿ uence
during SARS to threaten identi￿cation. One speci￿c concern is that heterogeneous supply
shocks during SARS may induce a correlation between the visits of group members. Another
possibility is that patients and their peers, having self-selected into the same group, may
share common traits such as risk aversion that a⁄ect the SARS response. Group members
may also receive correlated risk signals that cause them to exhibit similar responses.19
Our approach addresses these concerns by treating movers as a control group. By
exploiting the interaction between St, Ni, and ￿￿ v:ijkt, the regression di⁄erences out common
unobservables that are constant among movers and non-movers. The identifying assumption
18The use of a peer group ￿xed e⁄ect leads to bias in the coe¢ cient on the lagged dependent variable.
However, Hsiao (2003, p. 72) notes that the bias vanishes as T ! 1. With 78 time periods, this setting
features an unusually long panel. Moreover, bias in ￿4 is unlikely to contaminate the other coe¢ cients: the
pairwise correlations of vijkt￿26 with sl, sn, and StNi￿￿ v:ijkt are 0.002, 0.007, and -0.021 respectively.
19Our results are consistent with imitation of peers as well as social learning. Imitation of informed people
by uninformed people is a form of social learning that is consistent with our model (Apesteguia et al. 2007).
People may also imitate their peers because they simply prefer homophily. It is unclear why an emergency
would heighten the preference for conformity in the absence of a learning mechanism.
19of this regression is that common unobservables with a di⁄erential impact during SARS apply
equally to movers and non-movers. As part of this analysis, we implement a speci￿cation
with peer group ￿ year ￿ period ￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿xed e⁄ects in this speci￿cation control
for all group-speci￿c shocks that are common to both movers and non-movers. The di⁄erence
within a peer group between the responses of movers and non-movers is the only remaining
source of identifying variation. For social learning to arise spuriously, non-movers must
receive a targeted shock that does not a⁄ect movers.
We evaluate the possibility of non-mover speci￿c shocks by implementing a complemen-
tary identi￿cation strategy. Under this approach, we control for common unobservables by
conditioning on ￿ v:ijkt in a regression of vijkt on ￿￿ v:ijkt. This regression is identi￿ed through
the negative correlation between vijkt and ￿ v:ijkt￿26, as we explain further below. This frame-
work allows us to control for non-mover speci￿c shocks by controlling separately for the
current visits of mover and non-mover peers.
4.2 Baseline Results
Results based on speci￿cation (17) appear in Table ??. Columns 1 and 3 leave aside social
learning and show the response to local and national SARS incidence. These estimates show
a relatively small response to local SARS incidence. The response elasticity to local incidence
ranges from -0.0006 for probable cases to -0.0011 for reported cases. The response elasticity
to national incidence is several times larger larger: -0.0050 for reported cases and -0.0066 for
probable cases.20
Columns 2 and 4 add subjective peer assessments by incorporating StNi￿￿ v:ijkt and the
related pairwise interactions. The coe¢ cient estimate is statistically signi￿cant and implies
a response elasticity of 0.0048. Perceiving a higher SARS risk, patients who observe a decline
in peer visits also visit less often. Accounting for social learning and unobservable shocks in
this way attenuates the local incidence response by 62-68 percent and the national incidence
20Regressions that also include county-level incidence (available from the authors) show a small and in-
signi￿cant response to county-level information.
20response by 27-37 percent. Figure ?? plots the response elasticity by information source.
Information from peers and national incidence have comparable e⁄ects, while local incidence
has almost no e⁄ect. Although the ￿gure compares e⁄ect sizes, the model makes clear that
these e⁄ects do not map directly into structural learning parameters.
The speci￿cations in Table ?? evaluate the robustness of the social learning result. We
replace the SARS incidence variables with comprehensive time ￿xed e⁄ects. Although the
table does not report the coe¢ cients, these regressions also include all levels and pairwise
interactions of StNi￿ v:ijkt, as well as the one-year lag of individual visits. Column 1 shows
the baseline estimate, which is slightly larger than the estimates in Table ??. Columns 2 and
3 incorporate peer group ￿ SARS and peer group ￿ time ￿xed e⁄ects respectively. These
more restrictive speci￿cations only slightly attenuate the social learning estimate. Column
3 is identi￿ed exclusively through the di⁄erence between the responses of movers and non-
movers within a common peer group. For these results to be spurious, non-movers must
experience di⁄erentially strong unobservable shocks during SARS.
Columns 4-8 of Table ?? show that the social learning estimate is robust under several
alternative formulations. In Column 4, people must visit a doctor ￿ facility twice during
2001-2003, rather than once, in order to belong to a peer group. In Column 5, which broadens
the de￿nition of movers, people move if they transition across townships with overlap below
the 10th percentile of the overlap distribution, rather than the 5th percentile. Columns 6-8
de￿ne peer groups by facility, township, or county. De￿ning the facility as the peer group
leads to the largest social learning estimate. After that point, expanding the peer group to
include the entire township or county causes the estimate to decline.21
In the preceding estimates, a mover is de￿ned as someone with tenure in the community
21Our discussion thus far has analyzed the e⁄ect of a signal from peer group j on an individual￿ s visits to
the doctor ￿ facility associated with group j. In reality, people may also learn about SARS risk from their
peers in other peer groups. Patients in our data belong to a median of 7 peer groups. To construct ￿￿ v:ijkt
across an individual￿ s other peer groups, we compute the total number of peer visits in an individual￿ s other
groups and divide by the total population of these groups (excluding the index patient). Augmenting the
baseline regression to include the signal from other peer groups leads to signi￿cant e⁄ects of both group j
and other peer groups.
21of 1 or 2 years in 2003. We test the sensitivity our results to this de￿nition by interacting
St￿￿ v:ijkt with indicators for each tenure value from 1 to ￿ 7 years. Figure ?? plots the
coe¢ cients and con￿dence intervals from this regression. With the exception of years 3 and
4, the response generally rises with tenure in the community. The greatest response occurs
among people who have resided in the community for seven or more years.
Table ?? investigates the timing of the SARS response by category of diagnosis. Instead
of treating Quarters 2-4 as a common SARS period, these regressions interact Ni￿￿ v:ijkt with
quarter-of-2003 dummies. Column 1 shows that across all diagnoses, the social learning e⁄ect
is greatest in Quarter 2, followed by Quarter 4. While Quarter 2 coincides with the peak
of the epidemic, the result for Quarter 4 is initially surprising because visits fully resumed
by the end of Quarter 3. Distinguishing among diagnoses helps to explain this ￿nding. In
Columns 2-5, the social learning estimate is particularly strong for respiratory infections
but is virtually absent for critical or chronic illnesses. As Figure ?? highlights, the SARS
response for respiratory visits lasted through the end of Quarter 4.
4.3 A Complementary Identi￿cation Strategy
In this section, we corroborate our results through an alternative identi￿cation strategy.
The critical assumption of the non-mover di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence strategy is that movers and
non-movers experience the same unobservable shocks during SARS. An alternative to using
movers as a control group is to control for unobservable shocks by conditioning on the current
level of peer visits. The following speci￿cation regresses vijkt on ￿￿ v:ijkt and conditions on
￿ v:ijkt.
vijkt = ￿1￿￿ v:ijkt + ￿2St￿￿ v:ijkt + ￿3￿ v:ijkt + ￿4St￿ v:ijkt + ￿5vijkt￿26 + ￿jk + ￿t + ￿ijkt (18)
This regression controls for peer group and time ￿xed e⁄ects but cannot utilize peer group
￿ time ￿xed e⁄ects because it relies on variation across groups. The identifying assumption
22of this approach is that no omitted variables cause a spurious correlation between vijkt and
￿ v:ijkt￿26. Since ￿ v:ijkt￿26 enters ￿￿ v:ijkt negatively, only a negative correlation between vijkt
and ￿ v:ijkt￿26 may generate a spurious positive e⁄ect.22
Conceptually, this identi￿cation strategy ￿xes the current level of visits and compares
the response in peer groups where visits were previously high to peer groups where visits
were previously low. The risk signal is stronger in groups where visits were previously high
because visits have implicitly declined more to reach the current level.23 The level of peer
visits controls for unobservable shocks because this variable is the ￿rst term in ￿￿ v:ijkt. Any
contemporaneous shocks that in￿ uence ￿￿ v:ijkt must also appear in ￿ v:ijkt. The distribution
of peer visits is approximately binomial because 99.6 percent of people visit no more than
once per period; therefore ￿ v:ijkt is close to a su¢ cient statistic for the distribution of visits
by peers. Conditioning on ￿ v2
:ijkt can control for aspects of the visit distribution that the
mean does not capture.
This identi￿cation strategy allows us to address directly the concern non-mover speci￿c
unobservable shocks. The identifying assumption of the non-mover di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
in the previous section is that non-movers do not experience targeted shocks during the
SARS period. Because non-movers comprise 94 percent of the population, controlling for
￿ v:ijkt primarily absorbs unobservable shocks to non-movers. We re￿ne this approach by
calculating the level of peer visits separately for movers and non-movers. Distinguishing
between mover and non-mover peers slightly reduces the sample size because some peer
groups contain only one mover or non-mover. To address non-mover speci￿c shocks that
di⁄erentially a⁄ect other non-movers (the particular concern in Sub-Section 4.2), we interact
22To observe movers￿visits to their 2003 peer groups (a necessary aspect of the non-mover di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence), we must construct peer groups and measure behavior with the same raw data from 2001 to
2003. In regressions that control for ￿ v:ijkt, we can construct peer groups based on utilization prior to 2001.
De￿ning peer groups based on 1999-2000 utilization yields similar results.
23One mechanism that may induce a negative correlation between vijkt and ￿ v:ijkt￿26 is regression toward
the mean. Stochastic shocks may elevate visits in period t￿26 and suppress visits in period t. By conditioning
on vijkt￿26, Speci￿cation (18) controls for the e⁄ect of stochastic shocks on on the individual in period t￿26.
In addition, our regression focuses on the interaction between St and ￿￿ v:ijkt. Stochastic shocks would need
to become stronger during the SARS period to cause a spurious correlation.
23these variables with a non-mover indicator.
Regressions utilizing the complementary identi￿cation strategy appear in Table ??. The
coe¢ cient on St￿￿ v:ijkt provides the social learning estimate in these regressions. In Column
1, the baseline estimate of 0.128 is nearly identical to the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimate of
0.126 in Column 1 of Table ??. Column 2 controls separately for the average visits of peers
who are movers and non-movers. This distinction does not a⁄ect the social learning estimate,
suggesting that shocks speci￿c to non-movers are not an important source of bias in these
regressions. Column 3 also controls for the interaction between a non-mover indicator and
the visits of mover and non-mover peers. This speci￿cation permits non-mover speci￿c shocks
to di⁄erentially a⁄ect non-movers. Interactions with the non-mover dummy are small and
insigni￿cant, and the social learning estimate remains unchanged. Columns 4-6 incorporate
the square of peer visits into these speci￿cations, which only slightly reduces the social
learning estimate.
4.4 Chinese New Year
A falsi￿cation test based on Chinese New Year further validates the social learning result.
During Chinese New Year, both patients and physicians travel to reunite with family, causing
a 20-30 percent decline in health care utilization that is plainly unrelated to social learning.
Chinese New Year represents a combination of supply and demand shocks, both of which
threaten the identi￿cation of the estimates above. This approach speci￿cally addresses the
objection that unobservable changes in health care supply or demand may drive the SARS
results. Some o¢ ces close and others remain open during Chinese New Year, potentially
generating a correlation between ￿vijkt and ￿￿ v:ijkt. If unobservable shocks, either on the
part of patients or doctors, spuriously drive our ￿ndings, then an interaction with Chinese
New Year may generate the same pattern. We proceed by replacing St and all related inter-
actions with an indicator for Chinese New Year in the primary speci￿cations. Regressions
exclude data from the SARS period (Quarters 2-4 of 2003).
24Results for Chinese New Year based on both identi￿cation strategies appear in Table ??.
Column 1 replicates the baseline speci￿cation, replacing SARS interactions with interactions
for Chinese New Year. The coe¢ cient is 13 percent of the size of the SARS estimate in
Column 1 of Table ??. The regression that controls for ￿ v:ijkt yields a coe¢ cient that is 32
percent of the SARS estimate in Column 1 of Table ??. These ￿ndings indirectly validate
our methodology by failing to ￿nd social learning in this instance.
5 Dynamic Simulation
In this section, we simulate the dynamic response of visits to the SARS epidemic. The
response to SARS may have a dynamic component because individuals update their beliefs
about SARS risk using information from previous periods, including information from peers.
To simulate the dynamic response, we ￿rst estimate regressions that allow us to predict visits
in the current period based on information from the prior period. Then we simulate the
behavior of a hypothetical population of individuals in each period, updating peer behavior
in that period by aggregating individual responses before we simulate the next period.
This exercise also allows us to distinguish the relative in￿ uence of public information
and social learning. Although regression analysis cannot identify the structural parameters
associated with di⁄erent sources of information, zero values of these parameters also imply
zero values for certain regression coe¢ cients. To simulate the path of visits without a
given source of information, we simply zero out the appropriate regression coe¢ cients when
predicting individual visits. As an organizing principle, our simulation follows a thought
experiment in which we sequentially remove social learning, peer group shocks, and learning
from public information from the aggregate response to SARS.
255.1 Simulation Methodology
When conducting this exercise, we focus on simulating the behavior of movers rather than
non-movers. For non-movers, the response to peers may be correlated with the responses to
peer group shocks and public information. Therefore, one cannot zero out the in￿ uence of
social learning by simply setting any one regression coe¢ cient to zero and leaving other coef-
￿cients unaltered. Because movers arguably do not respond to social learning, the coe¢ cients
associated with their response to peer group shocks and public information are less likely to
be contaminated by social learning. Therefore, it is credible to simulate social learning by
movers by adding the regression coe¢ cient that captures social learning by non-movers to
regression coe¢ cients that capture the in￿ uence of other sources of information on movers.
The simulation includes four counterfactuals, which we summarize in Table ??.24 In
the ￿rst counterfactual, people respond to public SARS information, peer group shocks, and
social learning. The regression model for the ￿rst counterfactual is a variant of equation
(17) estimated on a combined sample of movers and non-movers.25 We simulate the visits
of movers by iteratively generating predictions using coe¢ cient estimates that capture the
behavior of movers plus coe¢ cients on the regressors Ni￿￿ v:ijkt and StNi￿￿ v:ijkt, which
capture social learning by non-movers.
The second counterfactual preserves the response to public information and peer group
shocks but shuts down the social learning channel. This is accomplished by simulating the
migrant behavior using the coe¢ cient estimates employed in the ￿rst counterfactual but
setting the coe¢ cient on StNi￿￿ v:ijkt to zero. The second counterfactual provides a conser-
24This exercise is based on the following algorithm. First, we create a simulation data set with 1000
hypothetical doctor￿ s o¢ ces, each populated with 61 patients, the median size of peer groups in the regression
sample. The simulation data set spans the period from 2002-2003. For each person, the number of visits
during period t in 2002 equals the mean of this variable for movers in the regression sample. Beginning with
the ￿rst period in 2003, we construct vijt using ￿￿ v:ijt and vijt￿26 based on lagged data according to the
requirements of each counterfactual.
25Our speci￿cation deviates from equation (17) in three important ways. First, we construct the regressors
as sums over periods t￿2 and t￿1 (rather than t￿2 to t), to avoid the need to determine vijt and ￿￿ v:ijkt
jointly in the subsequent simulation. Secondly, our regression eliminates the need to assign simulated people
to actual townships by omitting local SARS incidence, for which the e⁄ect is small. Thirdly, we add an
interaction between Ni and sn
t to allow movers and non-movers to respond di⁄erently to public information.
26vative measure of social learning because it does not zero out the coe¢ cient on Ni￿￿ v:ijkt,
which may capture social learning that occurs independently of the SARS crisis.
For the third counterfactual, in which people only respond to public information, we
estimate the regression for Counterfactual 1 on a subsample of movers. The sample restriction
caused all regressors continaing Ni to drop out. The simulation uses the coe¢ cient on
public information from this regression but zeroes out the coe¢ cients on ￿￿ v:ijkt and all
associated interactions. National SARS incidence is the only remaining variable that contains
information about the epidemic. Because this variable is largely orthogonal to ￿￿ v:ijkt,
neither peer group shocks nor social learning contaminates the e⁄ect of national SARS
incidence in the modi￿ed regression. The fourth counterfactual also excludes the response
to national SARS incidence by setting the coe¢ cient on sn
t to zero. This scenario provides
a benchmark for comparison to the other counterfactuals.
5.2 Simulation Results
Figures ?? and ?? show the paths of aggregate visits and respiratory visits under the coun-
terfactuals described above. The simulation isolates respiratory visits because Figure ?? and
Table ?? indicate that respiratory visits contribute substantially to the overall decline in vis-
its. In each ￿gure, we calculate the ratio of aggregate visits by period under Counterfactuals
1-3 to aggregate visits under Counterfactual 4. The solid black line presents average visits
by movers per period from our ￿rst counterfactual in which movers experience the social
learning of non-movers. The dashed line shows the result for the second counterfactual,
which excludes the response to social learning. The di⁄erence between this line and the solid
line represents the contribution of social learning to the overall response. Finally the dotted
line shows the response under the third counterfactual, which only includes the response to
public information. The di⁄erence between the dotted line and the dashed line represents
the response to unobservable peer group shocks.
Our simulation of visits for all diagnoses suggests that SARS incidence (public informa-
27tion) was the sole driver of the initial, sharp decline in visits. Peer group shocks and social
learning prolonged the decline beyond the peak in SARS incidence. By Period 13 (just after
visits reach their nadir), unobservable shocks and social learning account for nearly half of
the continued suppression in visits.26 By the end of the epidemic in Period 16, visits re-
mained almost 20 percent below normal27 and social learning accounts for roughly one-third
of all visit suppression. We ￿nd qualitatively similar results for respiratory visits in Figure
??. Visits drop further and social learning plays a larger role, explaining no less than one
half of the visit suppression that is not attributable to actual SARS incidence.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the behavioral response to the SARS crisis. Our analysis broadens the
existing approach to measuring the response to risk by comparing the response to public
and private risk signals. Estimates indicate that the response to information from peers and
the response to public information have similar elasticities. The social learning mechanism
may partially explain why people react more strongly to risks that are novel rather than
mundane. Our dynamic simulation indicates that social learning magni￿ed the behavioral
response to SARS risk. Future work will consider the collateral health impact of health care
avoidance during this episode.
Crises like the SARS epidemic occur with regularity. Past examples include the 9/11
terrorist attacks, the outbreaks of H1N1 and H5N1 ￿ u, and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
In 2011, the earthquake and tsunami in Japan in March forced many residents to assess the
risk of radiation exposure. Despite reassuring test results, consumption of Japanese seafood
fell dramatically because people worried about radiation (Fukue 2011, Kelland 2011). The
outbreak of a novel strain of E. coli in Europe in June caused an international scare over
26Visits in our simulation closely track the actual decline in visits by movers, for whom all visits fell by
around 25 percent and respiratory visits fell by around 60 percent.
27This result di⁄ers slightly from the ￿nding in Table ?? that social learning had the largest impact in
Quarters 2 and 4. This di⁄erence most likely arises because the simulation uses a single dummy for the
SARS period (Quarters 2-4), while regressions in the table use separate dummies for each quarter.
28Spanish produce before o¢ cials traced the outbreak to Germany (Patterson 2011).
The way people learn from their peers may strongly in￿ uence the duration and severity of
an emergency. Social learning can cause the perception of risk to deviate from reality in either
a positive or negative direction, leading to either an insu¢ cient or excessive private response.
By skewing individual risk perceptions, social learning may also in￿ uence the demand for
public policies related to risk, such as counter-terrorism or nuclear energy initiatives. As
a result, authorities may wish to control the extent of social learning about risk. Further
research should examine how education campaigns or more precise public signals a⁄ect the
reliance on information from peers.
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32Table 1: Summary Statistics for Movers and Non-Movers during the Non-SARS Period
P Value
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Individual Characteristics
Male 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.00
Age 33.1 18.4 31.3 17.1 0.00
Income 828.7 579.6 798.3 565.3 0.00
Group membership 9.6 6.9 10.0 7.0 0.00
Visits
--All 0.045 0.252 0.035 0.218 0.00
--Respiratory 0.018 0.162 0.014 0.137 0.00
--Critical 0.004 0.075 0.003 0.068 0.00
--Chronic 0.002 0.047 0.001 0.040 0.00
--Other 0.021 0.166 0.017 0.148 0.00
Change in visits
--All 0.007 0.326 0.006 0.290 0.00
Panel B: Peer Group Characteristics
Male 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.00
Age 32.6 18.7 31.1 17.2 0.00
Income 783.8 112.0 781.8 146.3 0.19
Non-mover 0.92 0.12 0.92 0.07 0.01
Group size 589 347 592 335 0.14
Physician male 0.91 0.18 0.93 0.14 0.00
Physician age 44.2 7.8 44.8 6.3 0.00
Visits
--All 0.153 0.072 0.147 0.066 0.00
--Respiratory 0.073 0.059 0.067 0.052 0.00
--Critical 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.015 0.00
--Chronic 0.006 0.017 0.005 0.010 0.00
--Other 0.063 0.041 0.063 0.037 0.57
Change in visits
--All 0.015 0.048 0.015 0.047 0.33
Number of patients 17,625 -- 11,876 -- --
Non-Movers Movers
Note: visit counts are tallied by two-week interval during each period.  Peer visits and the change in peer 
visits are tallied from periods t to t-2 for consistency with subsequent regressors.  Income is the approximate 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33 35Table 4: Learning from Multiple Peer Groups
Dependent variable:
(1) (2)
SARS × N × change in peer visits (group j) 0.082 0.055
(0.027) (0.027)
SARS × N × change in peer visits (other groups) 0.203 0.162
(0.041) (0.046)
SARS × N × change in peer visits (group j × other groups) -1.177
(0.555)
Fixed effects:
Peer group Yes Yes
Year × period Yes Yes
Sample size 17,239,224 17,239,224
R-squared 0.120 0.120
Individual visits (group j)
Note: standard errors appear in parentheses and are clustered by the patient's modal 
township.  The dependent variable is measured at time t while all of the regressors are 
measured at time t to t-2.  
34 36Table 5: Social Learning by Diagnosis and Quarter of 2003
Dependent variable:
Type of visit: All Respiratory Critical Chronic Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N × change in peer visits:
× 2003 quarter 1 0.038 0.055 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002
(0.032) (0.021) (0.009) (0.005) (0.022)
× 2003 quarter 2 0.117 0.071 0.004 -0.002 0.046
(0.039) (0.020) (0.016) (0.006) (0.025)
× 2003 quarter 3 0.064 0.025 0.002 0.007 0.033
(0.037) (0.019) (0.012) (0.009) (0.024)
× 2003 quarter 4 0.082 0.037 0.003 0.010 0.037
(0.036) (0.020) (0.009) (0.008) (0.028)
Peer group fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year × period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 17,239,224 17,239,224 17,239,224 17,239,224 17,239,224
R-squared 0.121 0.111 0.129 0.214 0.113
Note: standard error appear in parentheses and are clustered by the patient's modal township.  The 
dependent variable is measured at time t, while all regressors are calculated from time t to t-2.   Critical 
visits include visits related to pregnancy, abortion, injury, appendicitis, stroke, heart attack, and internal 




37Table 6: Regressions that Utilize the Level of Visits as a Control
Dependent variable: 
Specification: Group j Group j and 
other groups
Interaction of 
group j and 
other groups
(1) (2) (3)
SARS × N × change in peer visits 0.076 0.069 0.059
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
SARS × N × change in peer visits (other groups) -- 0.096 0.077
(0.038) (0.041)
SARS × N × change in peer visits (group j × other groups) -- -- -0.666
(0.402)
SARS × N × peer visits -0.077 -0.081 -0.159
(0.023) (0.024) (0.049)
SARS × N × peer visits (other groups) -- 0.010 -0.104
(0.035) (0.048)
SARS × N × peer visits (group j × other groups) -- -- 0.590
(0.315)
Fixed effects:
Peer group Yes Yes Yes
Peer group × SARS No No No
Year × period Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 17,239,224 17,239,224 17,239,224
R-squared 0.123 0.121 0.121
Individual visits
Note: standard error appear in parentheses and are clustered by the patient's modal township.  The 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42 44Figure 5: News Coverage of the SARS Epidemic
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